In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch
smb2_check_user_session() takes a shortcut for any operation that is not
the first in a COMPOUND request: it reuses work->sess (the session bound by
the first operation) and validates only the SessionId, then returns
"valid". It never re-checks work->sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID, and a
SessionId of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (ULLONG_MAX, the MS-SMB2 related-operation
value) skips even the id comparison. The standalone path
(ksmbd_session_lookup_all() plus the SESSION_SETUP state machine) does
enforce the VALID state; the compound branch bypasses all of it.
A SESSION_SETUP carrying only an NTLM Type-1 (NtLmNegotiate) blob publishes
a fresh SMB2_SESSION_IN_PROGRESS session whose sess->user is still NULL
(->user is assigned later, by ntlm_authenticate()). Used as operation 1 of
a COMPOUND with operation 2 = TREE_CONNECT (related, SessionId=ULLONG_MAX,
\\host\IPC$), the tree-connect then runs on that IN_PROGRESS session and
reaches ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request(), which dereferences
user_name(sess->user) with sess->user == NULL (transport_ipc.c:687/701/704)
-> remote NULL-pointer dereference and a kernel Oops that wedges the ksmbd
worker for all clients.
Reject any non-first compound operation that lands on a session which is
not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, mirroring the validity the standalone lookup path
enforces. SESSION_SETUP itself legitimately runs on an IN_PROGRESS session,
but it is never carried as a non-first compound operation, so multi-leg
authentication is unaffected by this check.
Metrics
Affected Vendors & Products
References
History
Sun, 19 Jul 2026 12:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch smb2_check_user_session() takes a shortcut for any operation that is not the first in a COMPOUND request: it reuses work->sess (the session bound by the first operation) and validates only the SessionId, then returns "valid". It never re-checks work->sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID, and a SessionId of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF (ULLONG_MAX, the MS-SMB2 related-operation value) skips even the id comparison. The standalone path (ksmbd_session_lookup_all() plus the SESSION_SETUP state machine) does enforce the VALID state; the compound branch bypasses all of it. A SESSION_SETUP carrying only an NTLM Type-1 (NtLmNegotiate) blob publishes a fresh SMB2_SESSION_IN_PROGRESS session whose sess->user is still NULL (->user is assigned later, by ntlm_authenticate()). Used as operation 1 of a COMPOUND with operation 2 = TREE_CONNECT (related, SessionId=ULLONG_MAX, \\host\IPC$), the tree-connect then runs on that IN_PROGRESS session and reaches ksmbd_ipc_tree_connect_request(), which dereferences user_name(sess->user) with sess->user == NULL (transport_ipc.c:687/701/704) -> remote NULL-pointer dereference and a kernel Oops that wedges the ksmbd worker for all clients. Reject any non-first compound operation that lands on a session which is not SMB2_SESSION_VALID, mirroring the validity the standalone lookup path enforces. SESSION_SETUP itself legitimately runs on an IN_PROGRESS session, but it is never carried as a non-first compound operation, so multi-leg authentication is unaffected by this check. | |
| Title | ksmbd: reject non-VALID session in compound request branch | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-19T11:59:31.616Z
Reserved: 2026-06-09T07:44:35.401Z
Link: CVE-2026-53383
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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