{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-55177", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-06-16T15:20:43.085Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-30T16:25:02.258Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T16:25:02.258Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in /api/esri* routes \u2014 user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-918", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.6, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/security/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/security/advisories/GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc"}, {"name": "https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/releases/tag/v13.10.0", "tags": ["x_refsource_MISC"], "url": "https://github.com/dfpc-coe/CloudTAK/releases/tag/v13.10.0"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "dfpc-coe", "product": "CloudTAK", "versions": [{"version": "< 13.10.0", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-30T16:25:02.258Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port>), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: <message>. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-r95q-fp26-h3hc", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

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