{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-55583", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-06-16T23:18:03.169Z", "datePublished": "2026-06-24T19:21:35.557Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T19:21:35.557Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"title": "Twenty: Cross-workspace IDOR in AgentTurnResolver", "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-639", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "type": "CWE"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV3_1": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 7.6, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N", "version": "3.1"}}], "references": [{"name": "https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/security/advisories/GHSA-v39r-w5vg-j9pp", "tags": ["x_refsource_CONFIRM"], "url": "https://github.com/twentyhq/twenty/security/advisories/GHSA-v39r-w5vg-j9pp"}], "affected": [{"vendor": "twentyhq", "product": "twenty", "versions": [{"version": "< 2.9.0", "status": "affected"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-24T19:21:35.557Z"}, "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Twenty is an open-source CRM (customer relationship management) platform. Prior to 2.9.0, Twenty was vulnerable to a cross-workspace insecure direct object reference (IDOR) in the AI agent monitor's AgentTurnResolver, in packages/twenty-server/src/engine/metadata-modules/ai/ai-agent-monitor/reso lvers/agent-turn.resolver.ts. The agentTurns(agentId) query and the evaluateAgentTurn(turnId) mutation looked up rows by agentId or id only; although AgentTurnEntity has a workspaceId column, it was not included in the WHERE clause, and the class-level guards only checked that the caller was authenticated in some workspace rather than that the requested object belonged to it, with the same flaw present in agent-turn-grader.service.ts. As a result, any authenticated user with the AI settings flag, a workspace owner by default, could target any other workspace on the same instance given the victim's agentId or turnId: agentTurns returned the victim's full chat history including message parts such as raw chat text, tool calls, and tool outputs, while evaluateAgentTurn inserted an agentTurnEvaluation row with the victim's workspaceId and fed the victim's turn into the default LLM. The agentId and turnId are non-guessable UUIDs but are exposed in the URL of the settings page. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0."}], "source": {"advisory": "GHSA-v39r-w5vg-j9pp", "discovery": "UNKNOWN"}}}}

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