When OAuth authentication is enabled and browser-facing TLS terminates at a reverse proxy that forwards the callback to Temporal UI Server over HTTP, affected versions derive authentication-cookie Secure attributes from the proxy-to-server connection. Temporal UI Server can therefore issue access-token cookies, and refresh-token cookies when provided by the identity provider, without Secure even though the browser completed login over HTTPS. A victim who visits attacker-controlled content while a credential remains live may expose that credential only if the attacker can also steer traffic for the UI hostname, prevent the browser's HTTPS connection from succeeding, serve the hostname over HTTP, and read a later same-site plaintext request. A malicious website alone cannot read the cookie, and passive observation of a successful TLS connection is insufficient. Effective HSTS, a blocking HTTPS-only warning, or TLS re-encryption between the proxy and Temporal UI Server prevents the demonstrated disclosure path. A recovered credential may be replayed within the victim's assigned permissions. Refresh-token replay additionally depends on the identity provider's issuance, expiry, rotation, and reuse-detection behavior.
History

Thu, 13 Aug 2026 10:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Temporal
Temporal temporal Ui Server
Vendors & Products Temporal
Temporal temporal Ui Server

Tue, 11 Aug 2026 21:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'no', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Tue, 11 Aug 2026 20:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description When OAuth authentication is enabled and browser-facing TLS terminates at a reverse proxy that forwards the callback to Temporal UI Server over HTTP, affected versions derive authentication-cookie Secure attributes from the proxy-to-server connection. Temporal UI Server can therefore issue access-token cookies, and refresh-token cookies when provided by the identity provider, without Secure even though the browser completed login over HTTPS. A victim who visits attacker-controlled content while a credential remains live may expose that credential only if the attacker can also steer traffic for the UI hostname, prevent the browser's HTTPS connection from succeeding, serve the hostname over HTTP, and read a later same-site plaintext request. A malicious website alone cannot read the cookie, and passive observation of a successful TLS connection is insufficient. Effective HSTS, a blocking HTTPS-only warning, or TLS re-encryption between the proxy and Temporal UI Server prevents the demonstrated disclosure path. A recovered credential may be replayed within the victim's assigned permissions. Refresh-token replay additionally depends on the identity provider's issuance, expiry, rotation, and reuse-detection behavior.
Title Temporal UI Server may set OAuth credential cookies without Secure behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy
Weaknesses CWE-614
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'}


cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Temporal

Published:

Updated: 2026-08-11T20:15:56.858Z

Reserved: 2026-07-22T18:08:48.925Z

Link: CVE-2026-65655

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2026-08-11T20:15:51.720Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-08-11T20:18:31.447

Modified: 2026-08-11T21:17:45.597

Link: CVE-2026-65655

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-08-13T09:49:26Z