{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-12045", "assignerOrgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "PostgreSQL", "dateReserved": "2026-06-11T20:40:06.461Z", "datePublished": "2026-06-18T23:37:35.182Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:35.182Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"providerMetadata": {"orgId": "f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007", "shortName": "PostgreSQL", "dateUpdated": "2026-06-18T23:37:35.182Z"}, "title": "pgAdmin 4: AI Assistant read-only transaction bypass allows unauthorised writes and remote code execution", "affected": [{"vendor": "pgadmin.org", "product": "pgAdmin 4", "repo": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4", "modules": ["AI Assistant", "LLM Tools"], "programFiles": ["https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/llm/tools/database.py"], "versions": [{"status": "affected", "version": "9.13", "lessThan": "9.16", "versionType": "custom"}], "defaultStatus": "unaffected"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Read-only transaction bypass in the pgAdmin 4 AI Assistant allows an attacker who can influence database content that the assistant reads to execute arbitrary SQL with the privileges of the pgAdmin user's database role.\n\nThe AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool runs LLM-generated SQL inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper to prevent data modification. The LLM-supplied query was forwarded to the database driver without restriction to a single statement or to read-only verbs, so a multi-statement payload beginning with COMMIT, END, ROLLBACK, or ABORT terminated the read-only transaction and ran subsequent statements in autocommit mode. The trailing ROLLBACK then had no effect.\n\nDelivery is via prompt injection: an attacker who can write content into any object the AI Assistant may inspect (a row, a column value, a comment) can cause the LLM to emit the multi-statement payload as a tool call. With ordinary write privileges on the pgAdmin user's role the attacker can perform unauthorised data modification. When the pgAdmin user's role is a PostgreSQL superuser or holds pg_execute_server_program, the chain extends to remote code execution on the database server host via COPY ... TO PROGRAM.\n\nFix validates the LLM-supplied query up front: it must parse to exactly one non-empty / non-comment statement whose leading real token (after stripping whitespace, comments, and punctuation) is one of SELECT, WITH, EXPLAIN, SHOW, VALUES, or TABLE. Transaction-control verbs, DML, DDL, CALL, COPY, DO, SET/RESET, and everything else are rejected before any database work happens. PostgreSQL's READ ONLY mode continues to backstop data-modifying CTEs, EXPLAIN ANALYZE on writes, and volatile side effects.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.16."}], "references": [{"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10022", "tags": ["issue-tracking"]}, {"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/bf4792444446f0e7ab721d23cbd6bfe6afaa7a8b", "tags": ["patch"]}], "metrics": [{"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Threat model: indirect prompt injection. An attacker with low-privilege DB write access plants a payload in any object the AI Assistant might read (table row, column value, comment). When a pgAdmin user with a higher-privilege role (typically PostgreSQL superuser or holder of pg_execute_server_program) opens the AI Assistant against that content, the LLM emits the multi-statement payload as a tool call. The crafted payload uses COMMIT / END / ROLLBACK / ABORT to close the wrapping read-only transaction, then COPY ... TO PROGRAM to gain OS code execution on the DB host.\n\nS:C is earned by the confused-deputy pattern: the attacker is not the LLM user; third-party DB content steers the user's LLM session to execute writes the user did not authorise. This does *not* score the user self-jailbreaking their own assistant -- only the indirect-injection vector.\n\nAlternative: AC:H (-> 8.0 HIGH) is defensible given LLM non-determinism (the payload doesn't fire every invocation) and the superuser-victim precondition. The 9.0 figure is the optimistic end of the range."}], "cvssV3_1": {"version": "3.1", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "userInteraction": "REQUIRED", "scope": "CHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "baseScore": 9, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H"}}, {"format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: indirect prompt injection, third-party content drives the user's LLM session, COPY ... TO PROGRAM reaches the DB host. VC:H/VI:H/VA:H + SC:H/SI:H/SA:H since RCE on the DB host compromises both pgAdmin's authority and the downstream system. UI:P captures that the user merely uses the AI Assistant normally; the attacker does not direct any specific user action."}], "cvssV4_0": {"version": "4.0", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H", "baseScore": 9.4, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL"}}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "description": "CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')", "cweId": "CWE-89", "type": "CWE"}, {"lang": "en", "description": "CWE-77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')", "cweId": "CWE-77", "type": "CWE"}]}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "value": "Isaac Chen <isaac9503@gmail.com>", "type": "finder"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "Dave Page <page@pgadmin.org>", "type": "remediation developer"}, {"lang": "en", "value": "Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>", "type": "remediation reviewer"}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}}}}

{}

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{"created": "2026-06-19T01:30:16.172169+00:00", "updated": "2026-06-19T01:30:16.172176+00:00", "vendors": []}